On the "Hirshleifer effect'' of unscheduled monetary policy announcements. by Banerjee, Anurag N. & Seccia, Giulio
 
 
 
 
Department of Economics 
University of Southampton 
Southampton SO17 1BJ 
UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion  Papers in 
Economics and Econometrics 
 
 
 
ON THE “HIRSHLEIFER EFFECT”    
OF UNSCHEDULED MONETARY     
POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS    
 
 
 Anurag Banerjee   
 Giulio Seccia                 
  
 
 No. 0213 
 
 
 
 
This paper is available on our website 
http://www/soton.ac.uk/~econweb/dp/dp02.html 
 On the “Hirshleifer e¤ect” of unscheduled monetary
policy announcements.
Anurag N. Banerjee and Giulio Seccia¤y
Department of Economics,
University of Southampton
September 27, 2002
Abstract
When monetary policy announcements are expected to occur at scheduled dates, the
event of an unscheduled announcement often “surprises” …nancial markets. However, if
the information provider knows the future policy beforehand, he might be induced to
anticipate the release of information without waiting for the next scheduled date, on
theassumption that better informed traders will be able to attain superior equilibria. On
January 3, 2001, (and subsequently onApril 18, 2001) thechairman ofU.S. Fed announced
a halfpoint interest rate cut well before thenext scheduled meeting. The real surprise for
the markets was the timing, not the content, ofthe announcement. In this paper we look
at the volume of trade in interest rate futures before these two dates and compare it to
thevolume of trade before scheduled meetings. We argue that the wrong timing ofpolicy
announcements might involve an “Hirshleifer e¤ect” and prevent a signi…cant volumes of
securities to transact for hedging purposes.
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11 Introduction
Independent Central Banks have di¤erent procedures of delivering their monetary policy deci-
sions to the public.
The monetary authority might announce interest rate changes at pre-scheduled and pub-
licly available dates, e.g. after scheduled meetings of the monetary committee. Today, many
Central Banks follow this procedure: among them, the Federal Reserve of United States (since
1994), the Bank of England (since 1997) and the European Central Bank (ECB). Alternatively,
the monetary authority might follow a discretionary procedure and inform the markets about
interest rate changes whenever considered appropriate. This was the case for the U.K. Trea-
sury before Bank of England independence in 1998 and for many Central Banks of European
countries (e.g. the Bank of Italy) before ECB was established.
Under rational expectations, were no transaction costs involved andmarketscomplete, prices
would perfectly re‡ect information and traders would continuously adjust their portfolios: in
this respect, the procedure and the timing of announcement should not really matter. However,
…nancial markets do respond di¤erently to di¤erent procedures. When announcements follow
a …xed and reliable schedule, agents trade and hold the relevant securities only for the time
necessarytohedge against therisk ofrate changes. Asigni…cant volumeof trade clusters around
the announcement date: before the scheduled date for hedging purposes and after the date, in
order to re-adjust the portfolio to the di¤erence between the realization and the expectation of
the rate.
When announcements do not follow a certain practice, agents hold hedging securities ac-
cording to their beliefs on the probabilities and magnitude of the monetary policy intervention.
Central Banks have often justi…ed the adoption of a scheduled calendar for monetary policy
announcements in order to reduce uncertainty, increase transparency and accountability and
dialogue with the public1.
Most importantly, Central Banks usually retains the option of acting between …xed an-
nouncement dates. Hence, if the information provider knows the future policy beforehand and
believes that better informed traders attain superior equilibria, he will be induced to anticipate
1See Bank of Canada press release (2000): The Bank expects that there will be a number of bene…ts from
…xed announcement dates that will make monetary policy more e¤ective. In particular, …xed dates will reduce
uncertainty in …nancial markets associated with not knowing exactly when the Bank might announce an interest
rate change. They should also focus greater attention on the economic and monetary situation in Canada; put
greater emphasis on the medium-term perspective that underlies monetary policy; and increase the Bank’s trans-
parency, accountability, and ongoing dialogue with the public. Together, these improvements should contribute
to better public understanding of the factors in‡uencing monetary policy and increase the public’s ability to
anticipate the direction of policy.
2the release of information without waiting for the next scheduled date.
By releasing the information before the trade in assets takes place, the information provider
might indeed destroy traders’ insurance opportunities. Agents trade in …nancial markets in
order to transfer income across time and contingencies. However, once uncertainty resolves,
there is no scope for exchanging income across states of nature: all agents would otherwise
arbitrage by transferring income into the realized state and out of the others. Timing plays
here a relevant role: Hirshleifer (1971) was the …rst to point out that an unexpected, early
release of information might have an adverse e¤ect on the volume of trade.
Several authors have extended and quali…ed Hirshleifer’s result on the adverse e¤ects of
public information, identifying conditions for public information to have social value. With
di¤erent degrees of generality, Marshall (1974), Green (1981) and Hakansson et al. (1982)
identify caseswhere apartial increaseofinformationcannotbe Paretoimproving. Wilson(1975)
shows that better information is Pareto impairing when agents have preferences represented by
a log utility function. Sulganik and Zilcha (1996) study the welfare e¤ects for a trading …rm
from exchange rates information improvements and Berk and Uhlig (1993) show that markets
might be (endogenously) dynamically incomplete if some agents can choose to purchase earlier
information. Recently, Schlee (2001) has given more general conditions guaranteeing that
public information is Pareto impairing and …nally, Sulganik and Zilcha (1996) have showed
that information referring to tradable assets might be undesirable if agents are enough risk
averse.
The relation between information and economic e¢ciency in economies with asymmetric
information has also received some attention. It has been pointed out that incomplete …nancial
markets with trade in nominal assets might have both revealing and non-informative equilibria
(Polemarchakis and Siconol… (1993)) but, due to the Hirshleifer e¤ect, equilibria associated
to prices that fail to be informative might or not dominate, ex-ante, the equilibria associated
to informational e¢cient prices (Polemarchakis and Seccia (2000) and Citanna and Villanacci
(2000)).
However, there is lack of empirical studies on the Hirshleifer e¤ect. Rejection of costless
information has been documented in two studies (Lerman et al. (1996) and Quaid and Morris
(1993)2) reporting cases of people rejecting free tests on hereditary diseases for fear of loosing
the insurance opportunity.
Our analysis looks into a quite di¤erent issue of undesirable, early release of public information.
On January 3, 2001, the chairman of the U.S. Fed surprised the …nancial markets by an-
nouncing a half point interest rate cut outside the scheduled Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meeting. The real surprise was the timing, more than the content, of the announce-
2The two papers are discussed in Schlee (2001).
3ment. The same happened on April 18, 2001. There were also a surprise quarter point cut by
the Fed on October 15,.1998 during LTCM and Russian Crisis.
In this paper we look at the volume of trade in interest rate futures, the instrument typically
traded for hedging against rates’ ‡uctuations. We compare the traded volume before the un-
scheduled meetings relative to the traded volume before the scheduled meetings. We present an
empirical time series model for the daily data of the interest rate futures. Our results indicate
that there is signi…cant decrease of trading activities before any unscheduled change of Federal
fund rates compared to a scheduled change. We therefore argue that a “surprise” in the timing
of monetary policy announcements prevented transactions of a signi…cant volume of securities
for hedging purposes.
Section 2 brie‡y describes the theoretical problem. Section 3 and 4 present the empirical
model and analyze the data on U.S. interest rate futures. Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the problem
The trading activity extends over T + 1 periods, denoted by t = 0;1;:::;T, under uncertainty.
At t = 0 the monetary authority announces the schedule of meetings of the Monetary Com-
mittee. Each meeting, denoted by i = 1;:::;I, is followed by an announcement on the interest
rate levels, one of …ve possible outcomes: ¡0:5;¡0:25;0;0:25;0:5.
The Central Banker announcement on the interest rate is based on private information and
on some form of the simple monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993):
rt = k + 1:5¼t + 0:5yt; (1)
where rt is the interest rate at t, ¼t is the in‡ation rate at t and yt is the change of GDP at t.
The variables entering the Taylor’s rule, GDP and in‡ation rate, are common knowledge.
These variables are o¢cially estimated and announced by the relevant agencies between meet-
ings. The traders know the rule and change their interest rate expectations accordingly. Con-
ditional on the realization of the macroeconomic variables, the economy is static. Agents’
portfolio composition is stationary.
At each period before the announcement, risk averse agents form expectations on the basis
of the Taylor’s rule and trade in interest rate futures in order to hedge against interest rate
uncertainty. They re-trade in the period after the announcements on the basis of the di¤erences
of expected and realized change of interest rate.
Figure 1 shows that on average there is more trade around scheduled meetings followed by
an interest rate change than during any other days. This has also been observed by the Federal
4Reserve Bank of Cleveland (FRB Cleveland) (Monetary policy report, July 2001). The FRB
Cleveland attributed this phonomena to ”... speculators trading contracts immediately before
and after FOMC actions and from hedgers adjusting positions in other short-term …nancial
instruments.” It also thinks that ”Increased futures- price volatility (around meeting dates)
may have driven up volume as well, as it has in other futures markets.”
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
The possibility of an announcement occurring outside schedule meeting, i.e. unscheduled
announcement, is unforeseen by the …nancial market participants. Such an unforseen event is
a “surprise” to the traders who will not hold the relevant portfolio from previous periods in
order to hedge against such a change in policy.
3 The empirical model
The trading behavior of risk averse agents is modelled as follows. We look at the traded volume
of short term interest futures as a function of changes of the Federal Funds rate following
scheduled and unscheduled meetings’ announcements.
vt = f(¢rt;Et(¢ri)) + ²t; (2)
²t ' ARIMA(p;d;q);
where vt is the volume of trading at time t, ¢rt is the change of Federal Fund rate at
time t; and Et(¢ri) is the market expectation of change of rate at the ith meeting given public
information at time t. We shall show that the two unscheduled meetings on 03 January 2001
and 18 April 2001 prevented agents form insuring against the cuts in the interest rate.
3.1 The model for expected interest rate changes
In his simple interest rate determination proposed as in (1), Taylor (1993, 1999) proposed as a
descriptive rule k = 1 in order to capture some important factors in‡uencing monetary policy
and the general stance of policy from the mid-1980s onward.
Assume that the market believes that the FOMC will be using a form of Taylor’s rule to
produce their monetary policy targets. The market reacts on the basis of any o¢cial announce-
ments of in‡ation rates and GDP, therefore
5Et(¢ri) = °1¢¼t +°2¢yt: (3)
Also, if the market believes that FOMCis strictly following the Taylor’s rule, then °1 = 1:5
and °2 = 0:5.
We compute the expected change of interest rate (Et(¢ri)) as
¢re
t = 1:5¢¼t +0:5¢yt: (4)
we then use ¢re
t as a proxy for E(¢rt) in equation (2).
We also take a generalized approach and directly include ¢¼t and ¢yt in equation (2) and
estimate the reduced form of the structural equation (2) and (3).
We work similarly when estimating the model (4).
3.2 Brief description of the data set
CBT30DAYt is the indicator of the daily volume traded of CBOTR ° 30-Day Federal Funds
futures at time t in the Chicago Board of Trade. RATEt is the Federal Funds at t determined
by the FOMCafter the scheduledandunscheduledmeetings. DRATEt is the change in RATEt
at t de…ned as
DRATEt = RATEt ¡ RATEt¡1:
De…ne DINFt, the change in in‡ation rate at t, as
DINFt = INFt ¡ INFt¡1;
where INFt is the annual in‡ation rate at for a 12 months period as released by the Bureau
ofLabor Statistics (BLS) at time t. We also usethe seasonally adjustedin‡ation …gures released
by the BLS as well. The Yt is the advanced, preliminary and …nal estimates of the quarterly
change in GDP as released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We de…ne
DYt = Yt ¡ Yt¡1;
which give us the changes in GDP growth estimates.
6The observations included in the dataset are from 03 January 1998 to 31 May 2001. There
are 30 scheduled FOMC meetings during this time
In the analysis above, the underlying assumption is that there are no signi…cant changes in
the structure of the economy, so we restrict ourselves to this relatively recent developments.
For longer time series data this assumption would be di¢cult to sustain.
4 Estimation of the model and results
We use a linear model to estimate the time-series model as proposed in (2). We di¤erentiate
between the announcements which changes the Federal Fund Rate and which do not. We
introduce two dummy variables,
DumDRATE
0
t = I [jDRATEtj = 0 and there is a scheduled meeting at t];
DumDRATEt = I [jDRATEtj 6= 0 and there is a scheduled meeting at t];
where I is an indicator function.
To capture the e¤ects of possible excess trading the day before scheduled announcements we
use DumDRATE0
t+1 and DumDRATEt+1: For the day after announcement e¤ects we include
the lagged dummies DumDRATE0
t¡1 and DumDRATEt¡1: We also introduce a separate but
similar set of variables to capture the e¤ects of the surprise or unscheduled rate changes by
introducing following dummy variable,
DumUDRATEt = I [jDRATEtj 6= 0 and there is a unscheduled meeting at t]:
To capture the e¤ects of possible excess trading the day before the unscheduled announce-
ment we use DumUDRATEt+1: For the day after announcement e¤ects we include the lagged
dummy DumUDRATEt¡1.
We include the variables DINF and DY to incorporate expected changes in Federal funds
rate (RATE) as described in equation (4). We therefore estimate the following model (referred
as Model 1).
CBT30DAYt = c +
1 X
i=¡1
®
0
iDumDRATE
0
t+i +
1 X
i=¡1
®
s
iDumDRATEt+i (5)
+
1 X
i=¡1
®u
iDumUDRATEt+i + °1DINFt + °2DYt +²t
7where ²t ' ARIMA(p;d;q):
From results in Table 1 we see that DINFt has a signi…cant e¤ect on the volume of trade
whereas DYt is not signi…cant. This is probably due to the fact that the FED gives more weight
on in‡ation than growth (by Taylor’s rule) and the market anticipates that. So in the next
model we directly compute the Taylor’s rule for incorporating the expected change of FED rate
by the market.
We can compute the expected change of interest as in equation (4), by
DRATE
e
t = 1:5 ¤DINFt + 0:5¤ DYt;
and plug it in to the following model (referred as Model 2) as
CBT30DAYt = c +
1 X
i=¡1
®
0
iDumDRATE
0
t+i +
1 X
i=¡1
®
s
iDumDRATEt+i
+
1 X
i=¡1
®u
iDumUDRATEt+i + °ADRATEe
t + ²t; (6)
where ²t ' ARIMA(p;d;q) and
ADRATE
e
t = jDRATE
e
tj:
We use the absolute value since the volume changes only with the magnitude of change of
the Taylor’s Rule.
From the results in Table 1 we …nd that the e¤ect of absolute change in Taylor’s rule is
signi…cant. So the market indeed believes that the FED is following the Taylor’s rule.
For the sake of completeness we also regress equation 6 with DRATEe
t (referred as Model
3).
[INSERT TABLE 1]
4.1 Comparing trading of unscheduled announcements with trading
of scheduled announcements
Our hypothesis is that the day before a FOMC meeting the market will be more active due
to insurance taking activities. This activity will be more so if the market anticipates a change
8in Federal Funds rates. We see from Table 1, that the market does not react the day before
scheduled announcements if there is 0 point change but there is a signi…cant amount of trading
activity the day before if there is a change.
If we look at the trading activity the day before the unscheduled announcement, thenwe see
that there is no signi…cant excess trade. In fact there is a negative (though not signi…cantly so)
trading activity before 15th October 1998, 3rd January 2001 and 18 April 2001 rate changes,
this even though two of these were a half a point change. The results are robust irrespective of
how the market formulates his expectations about rate changes.
5 Conclusion
When monetary policy announcements are expected to occur at scheduled dates, unscheduled
announcements, by preventing agents to hedge against policy changing, might have an adverse
e¤ect on the volume of trade3.
We show that there is more trade on the day before a scheduled announcement even after
taking into account actual changes in the federal funds rates and expected changes in rates, and
after explaining the trading volumes. When there is an unscheduled announcement this trade
is lost and our models show that this loss of trade is statistically signi…cant. An unscheduled
monetary policy announcement does entail an Hirshliefer e¤ect.
We do not perform a welfare analysis nor suggest whether the Central Bank should pre-
scheduled the possible policy announcements or should follow a discretionary rule. We just
show that by not following the schedule the Central Bank may prevent important hedging
opportunities by traders in the …nancial markets. So if the Central Bank opts for a scheduled
calender of policy announcements then it is better not to surprise the markets, or else it may
release information to the markets in a discretionary way4.
How markets and economies might perform under di¤erent regimes remains an open ques-
tion.
3Unscheduled announcements will have such an e¤ect only until the schedule is credible.
4This has been in the case of Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Contrary to the trend of major Central Banks in
the last decade, the RBI has switched from a scheduled bi-annual procedure of announcements to a discretionary
procedure in 1999. The RBI decided to make structural and medium term policy announcement on schedule
but decided that “[¢¢¢] short-term measures, such as changes in the Bank Rate, CRR, Repo rates, access to
re…nance, etc. may also be included if proposed changes in these variables happen to coincide with the timing
of the April statement. It will be understood that these short-term credit and regulatory measures are subject
to change at short notice in the light of actual developments and emerging external market conditions.” See:
Reserve bank of India, Press Release, April 1998. It is believed that the reason has been that scheduled meeting
has been weakening the independence of the Central Bank from market expectations on short term changes.
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12Table 1: Estimation Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1
Number of obs 855.00 855.00 855.00
Wald chi2 3222.25 0.00 2862.86 0.00 2853.63 0.00
Log likelihood -8131.75 -8129.61 -8129.25
Coe¤ p-values Coe¤ p-values Coe¤ p-values
DYt -267.26 0.56
DINFt 2603.73 0.00
DRATEe
t 1056.37 0.00
ADRATEe
t 1104.54 0.00
DumDRATE0
t 4018.24 0.00 3914.17 0.00 3908.92 0.00
DumDRATEt 11169.75 0.00 11112.00 0.00 11122.09 0.00
DumDRATE0
t+1 316.93 0.71 201.41 0.82 199.48 0.82
DumDRATEt+1 2537.12 0.00 2472.16 0.00 2482.89 0.00
DumDRATE0
t¡1 870.05 0.49 776.00 0.55 775.15 0.55
DumDRATEt¡1 3783.30 0.00 3795.35 0.00 3801.37 0.00
DumUDRATEt 14471.28 0.00 14775.30 0.00 14793.58 0.00
DumUDRATEt+1 -136.41 0.96 -337.12 0.91 -322.60 0.91
DumUDRATEt¡1 9113.06 0.00 9285.31 0.00 9297.85 0.00
Constant 5041.82 0.00 1257.93 0.36 1079.42 0.44
AR(1) 0.42 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.41 0.00
AR(2) 0.13 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00
AR(3) 0.14 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.12 0.00
AR(4) 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00
¾ 3266.30 0.00 3258.61 0.00 3257.27 0.00
13